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Abstract 
 
In 2011, the Hungarian government introduced seniority pensions (Female40): females, who 
have been accumulating at least 40 years of eligibility (related to the length of contributions), 
can retire at any age without actuarial benefit reduction. The elimination of other early 
retirement scheme in 2012 and slowly rising real wages made the program even more 
popular: the lifetime benefit was maximized at the earliest retirement. Since 2016, real wages 
have been growing rather fast; making delay attractive. Without being recognized, Female40 
has become a boomerang: immediate retirement from 2014 causes loss rather than gain to 
the retiree of Female40. 
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A Nők40 bumerángja: szenioritási nyugdíjak 
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Összefoglaló 
 
2011-ben a magyar kormány bevezette a Nők40-nek nevezett szenioritási nyugdíjat nyugdíjba 
mehettek azok a nők, akik legalább 40 éves jogviszonyt összegyűjtöttek az általános 
nyugdíjkorhatár elérése előtt, bárminemű biztosításmatematikai nyugdíjcsökkentés nélkül. E 
rendszer népszerűségét tovább növelte, hogy 2012-től kezdve megszűnt minden más 
előrehozott nyugdíjba vonulási lehetőség: a lassan emelkedő reálbérek mellett a 
továbbdolgozás olyan kevéssé emelte az éves nyugdíjat, hogy az életpályanyugdíj csökkent. 
2016-tól kezdve a reálbérek átlaga nagyon gyorsan nő, vonzóvá téve a továbbdolgozást. Ha 
ezt nem ismerik fel, akkor a Nők40 bumeránggá változik, az azonnali nyugdíjba vonulás 
nyereségből veszteséggé változik. 
 
Tárgyszavak:  társadalombiztosítási nyugdíj, előrehozott nyugdíj, szenioritási nyugdíjak, 
optimális nyugdíjba vonulási kor  
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper, I consider a Hungarian early retirement scheme what I call Female40. This 
scheme allows any female who had accumulated 40 years of eligibility (related to but not 
identical to 40 years of contributions) to retire before reaching the full benefit retirement age 
without suffering any actuarial deduction. (All other early retirement schemes are closed 
down.) I show that if the real wage growth is slow, then Female40 is advantageous to its 
participants but it becomes a boomerang with fast real wage growth, occurring from 2016. I 
presume that this result may have relevance for other seniority retirement systems as well. 
 
With the spectacular rise of Social Security in the 1970s, early retirement has become a norm 
(Burtless, 1986). In contrast, during the last decades, the average retirement age has been 
growing all over the world. In addition to rising full retirement age, the incentives of delayed 
retirement and the disincentives for early retirement have generally become stronger (e.g. 
Gruber, eds. 2004). The system called Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) has even 
eliminated full retirement age as unnecessary. As a trend, exemptions for females have also 
been phased-out; for example, the gap between full male and female retirement ages and the 
special exemptions have generally been reduced or eliminated. These trends have generally 
been followed in the ex-communist countries, too (cf. Domonkos and Simonovits, 2016).  
 
As a reaction, several governments tried to lighten the burden of higher retirement age. 
Populist governments decreased full retirement age in France, Italy and Poland. From the 
point of view of the present paper, however, the German reform in 2014 is the most pertinent: 
the full retirement age of 65 growing to 67 years was reduced to 63, conditional on 45 years 
of contributions––a type of seniority pensions. While the German government claims it is a 
deserved measure, its critics evaluate it as undeserved (cf. Laub, 2018).  
 
These trends have also characterized Hungary. The full retirement age rose from 55/60 in 
1995 to 62/62 by 2009; a significant further rise was enacted in 2009, ending with 65 by 2022. 
The strengthened disincentives made early retirement even more costly, and the new system 
of 2009 resembled an actuarial fair system (NDC). In the latter, the new benefit is the ratio of 
the lifetime contribution divided by the expected remaining life expectancy. As already said 
above, But in 2011, the new government introduced Female40: those females who obtained at 
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least 40 years of eligibility can retire much before reaching the full retirement age without 
suffering any actuarial benefit reduction. (Note that the eligibility period does not contain 
years spent in vocal schools or at higher education. While the benefit is proportional to the 
former, the Female40 depends on the latter. In Table 2, the former is above 40 on average.) 
The Female40’s popularity has been further enhanced by the elimination of any other channel 
of early retirement since 2012. At least half the new female retirees chose it (Tables 1 and 2 
below). Under moderate real wage growth (see Table 4 below), this reform made the lifetime 
benefit a decreasing function of the retirement age from the start, and put its maximum at the 
implicit minimal retirement age defined by the sum of the entry-to-labor age + 40, i.e. cc. 55–
60 years.   
 
Czeglédi, Simonovits, Szabó and Tir (2017) critically analyzed the Hungarian retirement 
rules, and widely documented the problems of Female40. One form of the inequities is the 
strongly negative correlation between the retirement age and the length of contribution. 
Granseth, Keck, Nagl, Simonovits and Tir (2019) also studied the correlation coefficient in an 
international framework.  
 
The proponents of Female40 have hardly mentioned that such a system is very unfair to those 
workers (males or females) who are close to the full retirement age and––due to the 
fragmented labor careers––have a little shorter length of eligibility. To make the point, 
compare two women having unit net wages during all their careers. In 2016, A was of age 60, 
worked 40 years and expectedly will live another 19 years; and C was of age 63, worked for 
39 years and––neglecting death between 60 and 63––had 16 years of remaining life 
expectancy. Calculating with a marginal accrual rate of 2%/year, and an actuarial reduction of 
6%/year, we have the following result: A’s and C’s annual benefits would be  
(1–3x0.06)x0.02x40 = 0.656 and 0.02x0.39 = 0.78, respectively. Furthermore, the 
corresponding lifetime benefits of A and C would be the same, namely 19x0.656 = 12.5 
=16x0.78 units. In contrast, Female40 raises A’s benefit from 0.656 to 0.8, and her lifetime 
benefit from 12.5 to 19x0.8 = 15.2 units.  
 
Since 2016, the real value of the average Hungarian net wages has been growing very fast 
(Table 4), lifting the real value of the average new pensions in parallel with a one-year lag. 
The unemployment rate has drastically fallen, making older-age employment easier. 
Therefore one would expect that more and more eligible women continued working beyond 
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the earliest retirement age, say 55–60 years. Returning to A, recall that she retired in 2016 just 
having the 40 years of contributions and of eligibility. If she continued working until 2019, 
however, her wage would grow by 28%, her total accrual rate would rise from 80 to 86%, 
therefore her annual pension would be multiplied by 1.28x1.075 =1.376 i.e. it grew to 1.104 
units, all in real terms. Though she would enjoy this elevated pension only for 16 years, her 
lifetime pension wealth would still rise to 17.7 units, by 16.2% with respect to the immediate 
15.2 units. 
 
Not only our ordinary female worker but even the bulk of the Hungarian experts has not 
realized this boomerang effect of Female40; or if they have realized, they have kept their 
secret for themselves. Unfortunately, the scanty official data on Female40 (Tables 1–3 below) 
precludes any sensible estimation of the percentage of women who avoided the boomerang 
effect by delaying their retirement. 
 
In Section 2, I present the basic numbers on the characteristics of female retirement in 
between 2011 and 2016 and on the real wage growth between 2010 and 2021,. In Section 3, I 
discuss the optimal retirement age of farsighted females without taking into account the 
additional measures like overindexation of pensions between 2013 and 2016 and the ad hoc 
additional benefits in 2017 and 2018. Section 4 extends the analysis to these additional 
measures. Section 5 replaces the farsighted worker with a naïve one, who only forecasts real 
wages by one-year ahead. Section 6 discusses the findings and draws the conclusions. 
 
2. Basic data 
 
Since 2009, in Hungary the rise of full retirement age can be described as follows: 62 (2009–
2013), 63 (2016), 64 (2019) and 65 (2022). Between these years, the full retirement age rose 
and will rise by ½ year for those who were born in Spring and Fall in the transition years, 
respectively. 
 
Table 1 presents the mean retirement age and number of newly retired Hungarian females: all 
and Female40, respectively. Note that the share of Female40 has been quite high and the gap 
between the general and the special mean retirement ages has been rising to 2 years. 
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Table 1. The characteristics of new female retirees, Hungary, 2011–2016 
 
Years All Female40 
 Meana retirement 
age 
Number, in 000 Meana retirement 
age 
Number, in 000 
2011 58.5 85.0 57.6 54.8 
2012 59.2 51.2 57.8 26.6 
2013 59.6 40.2 58.0 24.1 
2014 59.6 39.1 58.3 27.6 
2015 60.0 41.6 58.7 28.6 
2016 61.0 55.0 59.0 29.0 
2017b 60.9 45.5 59.3 28.4 
 
Source. Fazekas and Köllő, eds. (2017), Table 11.5, p. 269. a) We replaced the original, adjective 
median and b) the data of 2017 are taken from other sources. 
 
Table 2 presents the distribution of age and length of contribution of women retiring in 
Female40 in 2013. Note that only 56% of the new Female40 retirees had just 40 years of 
contribution but the data do not tell us the years of eligibility. 
 
Table 2. Data of Female40, 2013 
Birth 
year 
Size 
distri- 
bution, 
% 
Average 
reti- 
rement 
age 
Average 
length 
of 
contri-
bution 
Size distribution according to contribution length, 
% 
40 41 42 43 44 
1953     4.9 60.0 41.5 37.7 29.4 18.4   4.9 5.1 
1954   26.6 59.0 41.1 59.7 16.1   8.5   8.5 4.4 
1955   32.9 58.2 41.1 61.4   9.3 15.2 10.5 1.7 
1956   17.7 57.1 41.7 31.2 17.4 37.8 11.3 0.0 
1957     9.3 56.1 40.7 65.6 23.6   7.2   0.0 * 
1958     4.7 55.2 40.3 87.1   9.7   *   * * 
Average 100.0 57.9 41.1 56.3 14.8 15.9   8.2 2.0 
Source: ONYF (2014, 111–112, Table 6.9) 
 
Table 3 displays the distribution of the length of contribution and age at retirement of newly 
retired Hungarian females in 2016. (Note the divergence between these numbers and those of 
Table 1!) While the average length of contribution was 37.8 years, 35.5% of women retired 
within Female40 and another 8.9% at the borderline of age 63. 
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Table 3. Distribution of newly retired Hungarian females, 2016 
         Retirement age 
Length of contribution 
Early: 58.6  yr Full: 63 yr Average: 60.6 yr 
Short: 31.4  yr 0 0.551 0.551 
Sufficient:  41.2 yr 0.355 0.089 0.449 
Average: 37.8  yr 0.355 0.640 1.000 
Source: Calculated from a detailed table supplied by the Hungarian Treasury on public request. 
 
Average real wage changes are given in Table 4, where * refers to my forecasts with 
decelerating real net wage dynamics.  
 
Table 4. Time series of average real wage: 2010 = 100 
Year Net wage Year Net wage 
2010 100,0 2016 117,9 
2011 102,4 2017 129,9 
2012   98,9 2018 140,3 
2013 102,0 2019   148,7* 
2014 105,2 2020   154,7* 
2015 109,8 2021   160,9* 
Source: Central Statistical Office and my own forecast 
 
 
3. Farsighted females – no additional measures 
 
In this Section, we consider the choice of retirement age by farsighted females in Female40 
delaying the consideration of the impact of additional measures to Section 4. Let t be the 
index of calendar year, and vt be the average net wage of that year. Our heroine always earned 
the average wage and by year t, she just accumulated S = 40 years of contribution and 
eligibility. Her age (say 59) was well below the then current full retirement age, therefore 
even if she delayed her retirement by s years, she could not obtain delayed retirement credit, 
her benefit just grew from b0,t = δSv t–1 to bs,t = δ(S+s)v t+s–1, δ is the marginal accrual rate. (In 
the other case, the delay is much more profitable.) There are a number of possible objective 
functions what the retiree could consider but we choose the simplest one, the lifetime pension 
benefit in real terms: Bs.t = (T–s)bs,t =(T–s)δ(S+s)vt+s–1. 
 
Note that if one neglects the change in the real wage  vt+s–1, then the simplified objective 
function Bs.t = (T–s)δ(S+s)v attains its unconstrained maximum at s* = (T–S)/2 < 0 for 
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practical values of S and T. But in reality, there is an implicit minimum retirement age Rm 
=Q+S, where Q is the entry age to work, Q ≥ 15 years. Obviously, Q+S+so < Rm, therefore 
the constrained maximum is attained at so =Rm–S–Q. If one takes into account the persistent 
changes in vt+s–1, then finding the constrained maximum is not trivial. 
 
For convenience, we replace the earliest retirement age from 60 to 59 and assume that those 
spend another T = 20 years in retirement. Substituting the data of Table 1 into our formulas, 
we obtain Table 5. Columns 1 and 2 show the calendar time (t) and the delay (s), respectively. 
Columns 3 and 4 respectively display the annual and the lifetime benefits (the latter, for a 
farsighted worker, who knows the real wage dynamics in advance for three years.) For 
example, in the row (2012, 1), 0.811 and 15.4 units show the new and the lifetime benefits for 
a woman, respectively, who retired in 2013 with 41 years of contributions.  (Column 5 will be 
explained in Section 4.) The maximal values are italicized. For example, those who could 
retire in 2011 and 2012 in Female40 and retired immediately (sto = 0), chose optimally, while 
from 2013, the optimal decision was maximal delay (sto = 3). (Note that we obtained 
numerically different results here than in the example in the Introduction, because here we 
calculate with net wage v2016 =1.179, while we had unit net wage there.) 
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Table 5. Optimal delay of retirement in Female 40 (pure and mixed) 
Year Delay Annual benefit Pure  Mixed 
Lifetime benefit 
t S bs.t Bs.t  Bs.t 
2011 0 0.800 16.0 19.4 
1 0.840 16.0 19.5 
2 0.831 15.0 17.9 
3 0.877 14.9 17.5 
     
2012 0 0.819 16.4 20.1 
1 0.811 15.4 18.5 
2 0.857 15.4 18.2 
3 0.905 15.4 17.9 
     
2013 0 0.791 15.8 19.1 
1 0.836 15.9 18.9 
2 0.884 15.9 18.6 
3 0.944 16.1 18.5 
     
2014 0 0.816 16.3 18.5 
1 0.863 16.4 19.3 
2 0.922 16.6 19.2 
3 1.014 17.2 19.8 
     
2015 0 0.842 16.8 19.9 
1 0.900 17.1 19.9 
2 0.990 17.8 20.5 
3 1.117 19.0 21.6 
     
2016 0 0.878 17.5 20.5 
1 0.967 18.4 21.2 
2 1.091 19.6 22.4 
3 1.207 20.5 23.2 
     
2017 0 0.943 18.9 21.9 
1 1.065 20.2 23.2 
2 1.179 21.2 24.1 
3 1.279 21.7 24.6 
     
2018 0 1.039 20.8 23.9 
1 1.151 21.9 24.9 
2 1.249 22.5 25.4 
3 1.330 22.6 25.5 
 
4. Additional benefit measures 
 
The Hungarian pension policy has very rarely followed the main rules (for details, Ádám and 
Simonovits, 2018). For example, between 2013 and 2016, the inflationary forecasts were 
significantly higher than the actual inflation rates: their difference (or more precisely: the ratio 
of the forecasted inflation coefficient to the actual one–1) were as follows: 3.4% (2013), 2.6% 
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(2014), 1.9% (2015) and 1.9% (2016). The actual benefits in progress rose in real terms the 
same way, this I call overindexation of benefits, and these raises formed the proportional basis 
of further benefit raises (kt+s+u). In addition, in 2017 and 2018, the government applied the 
Pension Plus (enacted by a previous government in 2010 as a symbolic replacement of the 
earlier 13th month benefit) and a modest extra benefit called Elisabeth voucher (named after a 
benevolent Hungarian princess of the 13th century). These extra benefits (mt+s+u ) have been 
more or less flat, and amounted to cc. 1–2% of the average pension. In our new calculations, 
we assume that there will not be such surprise raises except for the Elisabeth voucher of 1% 
of annual average benefit. We shall now calculate with these extended benefits and the 
corresponding objective functions:  
bs,t,0 = δ(S+s)v t+s–1 , bs,t,u = bs,t,u–1 kt+s+u + mt+s+u  and Bs.t =Σ u bs,t,u. 
 
All these additions may have modified the optimal delay. Indeed, as Column 5 of Table 5 
demonstrates, in 2011, the 1-year rather than the 0-year delay would have been optimal, while 
in 2013, the 0-year rather than the 3-year delay would have been optimal. In other years, these 
additions have not modified the optimal delay. 
 
5. Naïve worker 
 
Until now, we have not only assumed that our heroines understood the system perfectly; but 
also that they had a perfect foresight. Now we replace the second assumption with a weaker 
one: at the end of year t+s, when they decide (possibly not at the first occasion) on their 
retirement, they do know not only the current average wage but also the next year’s value. 
And they always consider delaying retirement just by 1 year. In our example, this bounded 
prevision is enough, they always choose the same delay as if they had unbounded prevision. 
But in other cases, this is generally not true.   
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
 
In this paper, we have studied a special Hungarian seniority pension scheme, Female40, 
which rewards any female with a full benefit (without actuarial deduction) even if she has not 
reached the full retirement age but accumulated at least 40 years of eligibility. We have 
analyzed three related models: 1) the basic model, where the heroine knows the real wage 
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dynamics in advance but excludes additional measures; 2) the extended model, where the 
heroine knows the real wage dynamics and the additional measures in advance; 3) the naïve 
heroine who only forecasts and considers the average real wage one year ahead and neglects 
the extended benefits. In models 1 and 3, the optimal delay of retirement is the same in all the 
eight years; while in the extended model, the additional measures modify the optimal 
retirement age in years 2011 and 2013. 
 
For simplicity, we have neglected a number of complicating technical factors: (i) We have 
chosen the simplest objective function, namely the lifetime benefit; we have not even 
discounted it, not speaking about replacing it with a traditional lifetime utility function. (ii) 
We have not distinguished the length of contributions and the of the eligibility period.   (iii) 
We have neglected the fine structure of years consisting of 12 months, the more so because 
even the 11th month of the last year of contribution is neglected in the Hungarian benefit 
calculations. (iv) We have not discussed the lifetime balance of contributions and benefits 
either (see Granseth et al., 2019, Appendix B without real wage rise). (v) Our model is 
especially relevant if our heroines can work after retiring until reaching the full retirement 
age. 
 
In this paper, we have assumed that the heroines of type A, close to retirement in 2011,…, 
2018, or at least their advisers understood the pension rules, especially the impact of real 
wages on the benefits. This assumption is very far from reality, and its neglect leads to 
unconditional early retirement in the framework of Female40. Suppose that this decision 
appears to be optimal, but having retired, our heroines exchange experiences with similar 
retirees younger by 1, 2 or 3 years. Then the older retirees may realize that the government’s 
scheme was a boomerang: it would have been better to retire later and enjoy the much higher 
annual benefits for a little shorter period.  
 
I do not claim that the Hungarian government intentionally has misled a large part of the new 
female retirees (cf. Ádám and Simonovits, 2018). Probably its experts have not made the 
calculations outlined here or if they did, then they dared not share them with their bosses. The 
parties of opposition have also remained silent or some of them even demanded the extension 
of Female40 to Male40. But apart from good or bad intentions, a lot of Hungarian citizens 
lost, and this could have been avoided with more wisdom, honesty and openness.  
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